Dynamic modeling of pulse fishing: A game theoretic approach. MPRA Paper 47871, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Dynamic modeling of pulse fishing: A game theoretic approach. MPRA Paper 47871, University Library of Munich, Germany. In common with G. Papageorgiou (2013).

This paper is concerned with the classic topic of intertemporal resource economics: the optimal harvesting of renewable natural resources over time by one and several resource owners with conflicting interests. The traditional management model, dating back to Plourde (1970), is extended towards a two–state model in which harvesting equipment is treated as a stock variable. As a consequence of this extension, equilibrium dynamics with bifurcations and limit cycles occur. We also discuss conflicts as a game with two types of players involved: the traditional fishermen armed with the basic equipment and the heavy equipment users. Both players have a common depletion function, considered as harvesting, which is dependent together on personal effort and on intensity of equipment’s usage.